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Policy context
In 2010, the incoming Coalition Government 
pressed ahead with plans set in train by the 
previous administration for a programme of 
welfare reform that placed conditionality and 
responsibility at the heart of welfare policy. In 
March 2012, strengthened conditionality and 
a harsher sanctions regime were enshrined 
in law when the Welfare Reform Act 2012 
received royal assent. A key change has been 
increased severity and length of sanctions: 
a claimant can have their benefit withheld 
for up to three years if they do not meet the 
stringent requirements now placed upon them. 
The core objective of welfare reform is to 
encourage (support, incentivise) more people 
into work, underpinned by the view that 
rights must be balanced by responsibilities; 
that no one should get ‘something for 
nothing’. Government rationale for the 
use of sanctions is that they are effective 
in changing behaviour that will, in turn, 
reduce unemployment. However, with no 
robust evidence to support this claim, the 
effectiveness and fairness of the sanctions 
regime has been questioned.
Sanctions: trends and numbers
In the past 13 years 6.8m sanctions have 
been applied to Job Seekers Allowance 
(JSA) claimants and, since the introduction of 
Employment Support Allowance (ESA) in 2008, 
115,300 sanctions have been applied to ESA 
claimants. However, the sanctions rate has 
increased dramatically over the past five 
years and, in particular, since the introduction 
of the new regime in 2012. For example:
•	 The number of JSA sanctions per 100 
claimants has almost tripled, from 2.5 
sanctions per 100 claimants per month 
in the year ending March 2001 to seven 
per 100 claimants per month in the year 
ending March 2014
•	 The average monthly number of JSA 
sanctions has risen dramatically from 
35,500 a month up to October 2012 to 
84,800 after this date
•	 There has been more than a three-fold 
increase in ESA sanctions from 1,400 per 
month in March 2013 to 5,400 in March 
2014
The most common reason for a sanction at 
present is failing to actively seek work, with 
around one in three sanctions imposed for 
this reason. Over half of all JSA sanctions 
are at the lower level, one third at the 
intermediate level and currently less than 10 
per cent at the higher level.  
Sanctions and homelessness
The official statistics on sanctions do 
not include details of claimants’ housing 
circumstances. As a result robust data on the 
numbers of homeless people sanctioned are 
not available, representing a critical gap in the 
evidence base. The tentative insights that can 
be gleaned from wider evidence and statistics 
suggest that homeless people may be 
disproportionately affected by sanctions. 
For example:
•	 Claimants who are sanctioned and 
homeless people in hostels and shelters 
share some key characteristics, most 
notably age and gender profile. Homeless 
people are, therefore, more likely to be 
sanctioned - simply by virtue of their age 
and gender - before other factors are 
taken into account  
•	 Available research evidence suggests that 
a relatively high proportion of homeless 
people are sanctioned - one third 
according to one study
•	 There is a strong body of evidence that 
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points to an increased risk of sanctions 
amongst ‘vulnerable’ groups and those 
with characteristics likely to present 
barriers to navigating the system. 
Homelessness is rarely mentioned in these 
studies but we know from the extensive 
literature about single homeless people 
that such barriers (ill health, substance 
misuse, lack of work experience, literacy 
issues and low self-esteem, amongst 
others) are commonly experienced by 
homeless people.
Homeless people, then, may face a ‘double 
whammy’: disproportionally sanctioned 
by virtue of belonging to groups over-
represented in the sanctions statistics (young, 
male), but also more likely to experience 
barriers to complying with the new 
conditionality regime.  
Such evidence has raised questions 
about the fairness, appropriateness, and 
effectiveness of the sanctions regime in 
relation to homeless people. An independent 
review and the Work and Pensions 
Committee scrutinised the sanctions system 
in 2014 and found it lacking. Evidence is 
presented about poor communication, letters 
that are impossible to understand, lack of 
provision for people who face difficulties 
storing documentation, do not have access 
to the internet, and have limited literacy, and 
limited flexibility to accommodate claimants’ 
other commitments including hospital 
appointments and job interviews.
The impact of sanctions
Benefits are a vital lifeline to help people 
make the transition out of homelessness. The 
withdrawal of benefit will have a detrimental 
impact on any claimant but for those already 
suffering hardship the consequences may 
be particularly severe. There is evidence of 





•	 Mental and physical health problems
•	 Fuel poverty
•	 Debt
•	 Disengagement with the system
A small body of evidence is emerging to 
suggest that, as well as exacerbating the 
problems homeless people face, sanctions 
may increase the risk of homelessness. 
Principally this is because claimants cut 
back on housing costs (rent, board, service 
charges) or fail to reclaim Housing Benefit 
when a sanction is imposed, accruing arrears 
and risking eviction. This must be placed 
within the context of the raft of other reforms 
recently or currently being implemented 
that are increasing housing insecurity and 
reducing incomes, particularly for the poorest 
people and communities.
Next steps
In an effort to generate robust evidence 
about benefit sanctions and homelessness 
Crisis has commissioned the Centre for 
Regional Economic and Social Research 
at Sheffield Hallam University to conduct 
a research study over the next 12 months. 
The study will explore homeless people’s 
experience of the benefit system and of being 
sanctioned, testing the policy assumptions 
underpinning the current regime so that 
clear recommendations can be made to 
ensure the fairness of the system as it is 
applied to homeless people. It will consider 
the effectiveness of sanctions in supporting 
homeless people into work, and consider 
alternative approaches to delivering welfare 
and labour market support. 
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A new, harsher system of welfare 
conditionality and sanctions was introduced 
in 2012 and there has been increasing 
concern in the homelessness sector about 
the impact on homeless people. Evidence is 
beginning to emerge that homeless people 
may be disproportionately affected by 
sanctions, and that the conditionality, and 
sanctions for failure to comply, are not being 
fairly and appropriately applied. 
It is difficult, at present, to assess these 
claims and concerns robustly: the official 
sanctions statistics say nothing about 
claimants’ housing situations and so the 
numbers of homeless people who are 
sanctioned is not known. Nor is there 
much evidence about homeless peoples’ 
experience of being sanctioned, or of 
the potential impact of sanctions on 
homelessness.
In an effort to generate robust evidence and 
understanding on these issues so that clear 
recommendations can be made to ensure 
the fairness of the system as it is applied to 
homeless people, Crisis has commissioned 
the Centre for Regional Economic and Social 
Research at Sheffield Hallam University to 
conduct a research study to take place over 
the next 12 months. 
This scoping paper is the first output from 
the study. It reviews the evidence, scant as it 
is, on benefit sanctions and homelessness, 
providing detailed analysis of official 
sanctions data and drawing on research and 
policy evidence. It also details the policy 
context, setting out the stated aims of the 
conditionality and sanctions regime. Mainly, 
this paper serves to draw attention to the vast 
gap in understanding, but it does show that 
existing evidence raises serious questions 
about the appropriateness, effectiveness, 
and consequences of benefit sanctions for 
homeless people. 
1. Introduction
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Conditionality, backed by sanctions, has 
been a feature of the British social security 
system since the late 1980’s but intensified 
with the introduction of JSA in 1996 and the 
New Labour Governments of 1997-2010 
which placed conditionality at the heart of 
their welfare reforms. This approach was 
advanced further by the present Coalition 
Government which is in the process of 
implementing the harshest regime of 
conditionality in the history of the British 
benefit system. As Esther McVey, Minister 
of State for Employment explained in 2013, 
“we are ending the something for nothing 
culture.”2 
The blueprint for the current regime can be 
traced to a series of (Labour) Government-
commissioned reviews and Green and White 
Papers published 2006-2008: 
•	 With a ‘rights and responsibilities’ agenda 
prominent, the 2006 Green Paper, A New 
Deal for Welfare: Empowering people 
to work (2006)3 made the case for welfare 
reform on the basis that the existing 
system encouraged ‘the poverty trap of 
benefit dependency’ (p.2). It focused on 
Incapacity Benefit claimants, lone parents 
and older people and set out an aspiration 
to achieve an employment rate of 80 per 
cent.
•	 In 2007 Lord Freud was tasked with 
making recommendations for taking 
forward ‘welfare to work’ policies. 
His report, Reducing dependency, 
increasing opportunity: options for 
the future of welfare to work (2007),4 
argued for increased engagement with 
and support for (and conditionality placed 
upon) those furthest from the labour 
market. 
•	 The Freud report was quickly followed 
by In work, better off: next steps to 
full employment (2007),5 a Green Paper 
setting out the Government’s plans for the 
next stages of welfare reform, again with 
an explicit focus on those furthest from the 
labour market. 
•	 It was in 2008 that the Green Paper No-
one written off: reforming welfare to 
reward responsibility6 firmly placed 
conditionality and responsibility at the 
heart of welfare policy. In return for 
personalised support, jobseekers would 
be required to intensify their job search 
activity and legislation was proposed to 
introduce tougher sanctions for those who 
failed to do so. 
•	 An independent review by Professor Paul 
Gregg followed, setting out a vision for 
how the new conditionality regime could 
work in Realising Potential: A Vision for 
Personalised Conditionality and Support 
(2008).7 DWP meanwhile, published an 
evidence review on the effectiveness of 
conditionality (DWP, 2008a).
•	 The new regime was consolidated in the 
White Paper, Raising Expectations and 
increasing support: Reforming welfare 
for the future (2008b).8
2. Welfare conditionality: The “‘something for 
something’ welfare state”1
1 DWP, 2008, p. 29
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In 2010, the incoming Coalition Government 
pressed ahead with plans for welfare reform 
set in train by the previous administration, 
publishing a consultation paper, 21st Century 
Welfare,9 in their first few months of office, 
followed by the White Paper, Universal 
Credit: Welfare that Works,10 which set out 
their ‘commitment to overhaul the benefit 
system to promote work and personal 
responsibility’ (p.2). The ‘overhaul’ included: 
simplifying the system by, amongst other 
changes, introducing a single integrated 
benefit (Universal Credit); making sure 
claimants would be better off in work 
than on benefits; and ‘a strong system of 
conditionality… in turn [..] supported by a new 
system of financial sanctions’ (p.28).
The White Paper also made explicit the need 
to reduce welfare expenditure as a driving 
force for change, a rationale not prominent in 
previous policy publications but, with a five year 
austerity programme announced in the same 
month, now highly pertinent. The deservedness 
of those on whom public money was spent was 
scrutinised far more closely now the country 
was facing the prospect of massive public 
sector funding cuts. Taxpayers’ money was a 
scarce resource and the Secretary of State for 
Work and Pensions has since been keen to 
point out that ‘Taxpayers paid a financial cost 
for rising welfare payments.’11 Now, more than 
ever before, benefits claimants were invested 
with responsibility - to themselves but also to 
the taxpayer - to prove they deserved state 
support by doing all they could to seek, find, 
and take up employment. Articulated in terms 
of ‘ensuring fairness for the taxpayers who fund 
it [welfare]’, it was deemed only fair that those 
who failed to do so would lose their entitlement 
to support.
In March 2012, strengthened conditionality 
and the harsher sanctions regime were 
enshrined in law when the Welfare Reform 
Act 2012 received royal assent. The new 
rules applied to Job Seekers Allowance 
(JSA) claimants from October 2012 and 
Employment Support Allowance (ESA) 
claimants from December 2012. 
2.1 Overview of the new sanctions 
regime
A sanctions system was already in place 
as part of the JSA system introduced in 
1996, and the ESA system introduced in 
October 2008 but the Welfare Reform Act 
2012 introduced a far harsher system. Most 
notable of the changes is the increased 
severity and length of sanctions (see Table 
2.1), comprised of:  
•	 The introduction of three categories 
of sanction (higher, intermediate 
and lower) depending on the nature of 
the ‘offence’. Intermediate and higher 
sanctions apply to JSA claimants only 
while lower level sanctions apply to both 
JSA and ESA claimants
•	 The introduction of different levels of 
sanctions for first, second, and third 
offences with the penalty increasing with 
each subsequent sanction 
•	 A marked increase in the severity of 
sanctions which, for JSA claimants, can 
now be imposed for between four and 13 
weeks for the first failure and up to three 
years for the third sanction. ESA claimants 
receive an open-ended sanction followed 
by a fixed period sanction (of one week 
for the first failure, two weeks for a second 
failure, and four weeks for a third and 
subsequent failure in a 52-week period) 
when they re-comply. 
9  https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/181139/21st-century-welfare_1_.pdf
10  https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/181145/universal-credit-full-document.pdf
11  In a speech on 7 April 2014, Hosted by Business for Britain at Pimlico Plumbers, London: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/jobs-and-
welfare-reform-getting-britain-working 
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The conditionality requirements placed 
on claimants have also increased. 
The ‘Claimant Commitment’ has been 
introduced, which sets out a series of specific 
requirements placed on a claimant in return 
for receipt of benefit. Requirements must be 
‘reasonable, designed to help the claimant 
move into work, and reflecting the claimant’s 
particular capability and circumstances’. 
(DWP, 2014c: 6). In July 2013 new rules 
were introduced giving Jobcentre Plus 
advisors discretionary power to exempt 
homeless claimants found to be in a 
‘domestic emergency’, for up to four weeks, 
from requirements to be available for work, 
actively seeking work, or to participate in the 
Work Programme, providing they are taking 
reasonable action to find accommodation.12 It 
is not clear, however, whether such discretion 
is being exercised on the front line.
If a claimant breaches their conditions 
without good reason - for example if they 
do not apply for a specified number of jobs 
within a given period, fail to attend an advisor 
interview or a recommended training scheme, 
or are deemed not available for work for the 
requisite number of hours - they are referred 
to a ‘decision-maker’ who decides whether 
to apply a sanction. Claimants are informed 
of the decision by letter and, if they disagree, 
they can ask for reconsideration and then an 
appeal. 
Claimants can apply for ‘hardship payments’ 
if they can show evidence that they are at risk 
of hardship, as defined in special rules, as a 
result of the sanction. Hardship payments are 
made at 60 per cent of the normal JSA rate. 
Vulnerable claimants and those with children, 
if considered eligible, can apply immediately 
while payment is made after 14 days for all 
other eligible claimants.
The operation of sanctions is causing serious 
concern amongst homeless organisations 
who fear that homeless people are being 
disproportionally sanctioned, that the 
conditionality posed upon them is not 
realistic, that they face particular barriers 
to complying and that the consequences 
of sanctions are particularly severe for a 
population group already suffering hardship. 
These issues are explored further in 
subsequent chapters.
2.2 Key points 
•	 In 2010, the incoming Coalition 
Government pressed ahead with plans set 
in train by the previous administration for a 
programme of welfare reform that placed 
conditionality and responsibility at the 
heart of welfare policy
•	 Strengthened conditionality and a harsher 
sanctions regime were enshrined in law in 
the Welfare Reform Act 2012
•	 Most notable of the changes is the 
enhanced requirements placed on 
claimants, and increased severity and 
length of sanctions. A claimant can have 
their benefit withdrawn for up to three 
years if they do not meet the stringent 
requirements placed upon them
12 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2014/1623/pdfs/uksi_20141623_en.pdf 
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13 In a speech on 7 April 2014, Hosted by Business for Britain at Pimlico Plumbers, London https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/jobs-and-
welfare-reform-getting-britain-working 
14 See also a speech by Lord Freud on housing and welfare reform, June 22nd 2011: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/housing-and-
welfare-reform 
15 Although some do argue that, in certain - weak - labour markets,  one person entering the labour market is very likely to simply displace some-
one else and so no additional benefits are achieved (Fothergill, 2010).
16 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-welfare-revolution
The narrative of ‘responsibility’ and support 
for increased conditionality has grown 
incrementally over the past decade (see 
Chapter 2), and a change of government in 
2010 brought new policies and legislation, 
but the key messages have remained 
relatively constant. Premised on the same 
underlying values - that rights must be 
balanced by responsibilities; that no-
one should get ‘something for nothing’ - 
successive governments have justified their 
programmes of welfare reform with reference 
to similar policy objectives. In particular, to 
support people back to work.
3.1 “The best welfare policy of all is 
work” (DWP, 2006, piv)
Motivated by the benefits of work to the 
individual, their family and future generations 
the core, stated aim of welfare reform is 
to encourage (support, incentivise) more 
people into work. Talking in 2014, the 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, 
Iain Duncan Smith, reiterated this position 
unequivocally:
We drove a programme of welfare reform 
where every change was designed to 
get Britain back to work…In reforming a 
broken welfare system, I have had one 
overriding intention – to get Britain working 
again.13
In addition to financial benefits, it is argued 
that work is good for physical and mental 
well-being (Freud, 2007),14 and it allows 
people to develop skills and new habits 
which, in turn, promotes social inclusion 
(Gregg, 2008). Few take issue with this.15 
However, ‘getting Britain working again’ is 
intended to do more than improve financial, 
mental and physical well-being. It will also, 
it is argued, tackle the problems of benefit 
dependency and cultures of worklessness. 
As Lord Freud, now Minister for Welfare 
Reform, stated in a speech in December 
2011:
“That’s what the welfare revolution is all 
about - that’s the final goal - to bring an 
end to long-term benefit dependency and 
begin a cultural transformation.”16
Being in receipt of welfare benefits 
has become conflated with welfare 
dependency and the term ‘welfare 
dependency’ has distinct connotations 
in policy discourse. It is associated with 
‘cultures of worklessness’ and presented 
as the necessary antithesis of self-reliance, 
responsibility and independence. As such, 
‘welfare dependency’ becomes, implicitly, an 
individualised characteristic, a behavioural 
(cultural) failing. 
In this context, imposing conditions on 
benefit claimants, and sanctioning those who 
fail to address their ‘dependency’ makes 
sense, and is easily justified. Conditionality, 
backed by sanctions, has become a 
key means through which to affect the 
behavioural change apparently required to 
increase labour market participation. 
3. Benefit Sanctions: Policy objectives and intentions
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or 156 week sanction
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(WRAC) for first 
4 weeks, then 
100% WRAC
100% of the prescribed ESA amount open-ended until re-
engagement followed by a fixed period of
1 week 2 weeks if 
within 52 
weeks – but 
not two weeks 
– of previous 
failure
4 weeks if within 52 
weeks – but not two 
weeks of previous failure 
which resulted in a 2 or 4 
week sanction
Table 2.1: Overview of previous and revised sanctions regime
*In the case of intermediate sanctions, resumption of benefit is dependent on reclaim by the claimant. This may take 
part at any time after the five ‘waiting days’. The length of the sanction is adjusted according to the date of reclaim 
in order to ensure at least four or 13 weeks loss of benefit.
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17  https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/universal-credit-welfare-that-works
18 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/benefit-sanctions-ending-the-something-for-nothing-culture
3.2 Sanctions “motivate claimants 
to take the necessary action to find 
work, and to ensure the system is 
fair to the taxpayer” (DWP, 2014c: 5) 
The Government rationale for the use 
of sanctions is that they are effective 
in changing behaviour. In other words, 
the current sanctions system is not simply 
punitive. Rather, it is said to be critical in 
supporting the conditionality placed on 
benefit claimants that is, in turn, effective in 
reducing unemployment.  
Sanctions, it is argued ‘are critical to 
incentivise benefit recipients to meet their 
responsibilities’ (DWP 2010b: 28), i.e. their 
responsibilities to seek and take up work, to 
be independent and self-reliant. The present 
Government has argued that conditionality 
is effective in reducing unemployment, 
changing behaviour, tackling benefit 
dependency, and that sanctions, coupled 
with support and a simplified benefit system, 
incentivise claimants to comply with the 
conditions placed upon them. 
The sanctions regime is premised on the 
assumption that every claimant subject 
to conditionality is able to comply with 
the conditions imposed upon them. And, 
indeed, the system has been designed so 
that “requirements will be set according to 
individual capability and circumstance” (DWP 
2010b: 24) and sanctions should only be 
applied if a claimant fails to comply ‘without 
good reason’. If a sanction is imposed, then, 
it is because the claimant did not comply, 
rather than because they could not comply, 
as the following policy statements make 
clear: 
“That is why we are developing sanctions 
for those who refuse to play by the rules.” 
(Speech by Iain Duncan Smith at the 
launch of ‘Universal Credit, Welfare that 
works’, November 11th 2010, London)17
“We always make the rules very clear – it’s 
only right that there is a penalty if people 
fail to play by them.” 
(Esther McVey, quoted in a DWP Press 
release, November 6th 2013)18
But an independent review of certain 
aspects of the sanctions regime and the 
Work and Pensions Committee scrutinised 
the sanctions system in 2014 and found it 
lacking (Oakley, 2014; House of Commons 
Select Committee, 2014). The evidence 
gathered for these enquiries raised questions 
about: the implementation and effectiveness 
of sanctions; whether the rules really are 
made very clear; whether the conditions 
imposed are appropriate to capability and 
circumstance as they should be; and whether 
a reason for non-compliance is ever deemed 
good enough to avoid a sanction. The 
Select Committee recommended a second 
independent review with a wider remit than 
the Oakley review, so the effectiveness of 
sanctions could be assessed. The evidence 
presented had not convinced the Committee 
that sanctions worked. 
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3.3 Key points
•	 The narrative of ‘responsibility’ and 
support for increased conditionality has 
grown incrementally over the past decade 
but the key messages have remained 
constant, namely that rights must be 
balanced by responsibilities and no-one 
should get ‘something for nothing’. 
•	 The core, stated aim of welfare reform is to 
encourage more people into work, tackling 
the problems of ‘benefit dependency’ and 
‘cultures of worklessness’. 
•	 Government rationale for the use of 
sanctions is that they are effective in 
changing behaviour, and incentivise 
claimants to meet their responsibilities to 
seek and take up work. 
•	 However, when scrutinised, the sanctions 
regime has been criticised with questions 
raised about the implementation and 
effectiveness of sanctions. 
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19 The profile of homeless people, in terms of benefits claimed, is not known. We do not know, for example, how many are in receipt of benefits 
and, amongst those who are, what proportion claim JSA and what proportion claim ESA.  
20 Since December 2012 when the harsher ESA WRAG sanction regime was introduced.
This chapter presents analysis of the official 
sanctions statistics as applied to all Job 
Seekers Allowance (JSA) and Employment 
Support Allowance (ESA) claimants.19 JSA 
and ESA claimants are treated separately, 
given the differences in conditionality applied 
to these two groups. JSA sanctions account 
for the vast majority (97 per cent)20 of all 
sanctions imposed.
4.1 Numbers of sanctions 
In the past 13 years, 6.1m sanctions have 
been applied to JSA claimants in Great 
Britain, after successful reconsiderations and 
appeals. Ten per cent of original decisions 
were subsequently overturned and so the 
total number of sanctions initially applied over 
the period was 6.8m. 
4. Trends in sanctions




























































































































































































































Before reconsiderations and appeals After reconsiderations and appeals
Introduction of 
Work Programme
Introduction of new 
sanctions regime
Introduction of mandatory 
reconsiderations
10 Benefit sanctions and homelessness: a scoping report
21 A 12 month moving average up to the month shown is used tjo smooth monthly fluctuations in the time series.
22 Annualised rates are used to smooth monthly fluctuations.
23 The mandatory reconsiderations process was introduced from October 2013. This means claimant cannot go straight to Appeal at Tribunal but 
has to make an informal appeal to DWP first. These mandatory reconsiderations are currently recorded on a separate administrative system.  
Therefore Stat-Xplore data do not include cases where these decisions are overturned from December 2013 to March 2014.  This will mean 
monthly figures for sanctions after reconsiderations will be slightly overestimated for this period.  By using annualised figures this minimises the 
effect on the figures.
However, these 6.8m sanctions were not 
applied evenly over the period. Figures 4.121 
and 4.222 show clearly that the sanction rate 
has increased significantly. For example, 
the number of sanctions per 100 claimants 
per month has almost tripled, from 2.5 
sanctions per 100 claimants per month in the 
year ending March 2001 to seven per 100 
claimants per month in the year ending March 
2014 (see Figure 4.2). 
In particular, there has been a steady upward 
trend in the number of sanctions applied and 
the proportion of claimants sanctioned since 
the introduction of the new regime in 2012. 
The average monthly number of sanctions 
applied before reconsiderations and appeals 
has risen dramatically from 35,500 a month 
up to October 2012, to 84,800 after this date 
(see Table 4.1). The percentage of decisions 
being overturned after reconsideration or 
appeals has also risen, from ten to 13 per 
cent over the two periods.23 It is important to 
note that many sanctions go unchallenged: 







































































































































































































































Average monthly rate, 12 months ending
Before reconsiderations and appeals After reconsiderations and appeals
Introduction of Work 
Programme
Introduction of new 
sanctions regime
Introduction of mandatory 
reconsiderations
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24  Those with the severest of health problems are placed in the Support Group and are not subject to any conditionality.
only around one third of sanctioned claimants 
make any sort of appeal.
The expectations placed on those claiming 
sickness-related out-of-work benefits are 
different to those claiming JSA, as it is 
acknowledged that claimants are unable 
to work due to the severity of their health 
problems. However, the Employment and 
Support Allowance, introduced in October 
2008, imposed an element of conditionality 
on those who are placed within the Work-
Related Activity Group (WRAG).24 The 
expectations for ESA WRAG claimants 
include attending and participating in 
mandatory interviews or taking part in Work-
Related Activity that helps them to prepare to 
return to work.  
ESA covers claimants with mental health 
issues and drug and alcohol dependency, 
so these changes may have a particularly 


















6,799,000 6,097,000 40,500 36,300 90%
Pre new system 
April 2000 
to Oct 2012
5,357,000 4,842,000 35,500 32,100 90%
Post new system 
Nov 2012 
to Mar 2014
1,442,000 1,255,000 84,800 73,800 87%
Table 4.1: JSA Sanctions, Great Britain, April 2000- March 2014
Source: DWP Stat-Xplore
marked impact within the homeless 
community. Currently half of all ESA WRAG 
claimants have a main diagnosis of mental 
and behavioural disorder and this proportion 
has been steadily increasing.
Since the introduction of ESA in 2008, 
115,300 sanctions have been applied to 
ESA claimants, of which 99,200 (86 per 
cent) were upheld after reconsiderations and 
appeals. However, the use of sanctions on 
ESA claimants has risen sharply over time. 
In particular, the introduction of the tougher 
regime for ESA claimants in December 
2012 marked a sharp rise in the number of 
sanctions. In the year to March 2013, a total 
of 16,400 ESA sanctions had been applied 
(before reconsiderations and appeals) but this 
figure had risen to 42,200 ESA sanctions, by 
March 2014 (35,600 after reconsiderations 
and appeals). Monthly figures further 
highlight the rapid increase in ESA sanctions, 
12 Benefit sanctions and homelessness: a scoping report
25  http://www.benefitsandwork.co.uk/news/2829-esa-claimants-subject-to-massive-increase-in-sanctions 
with nearly a four-fold increase (before 
reconsiderations and appeals) from 1,400 
in March 2013 to 5,400 in March 2014 (see 
Figure 4.3). This represents 1 sanction per 
100 ESA claimants in the WRAG - lower 
than the rate of sanctions for JSA claimants, 
but still signifying a tripling in the rate of 0.3 
sanctions per 100 claimants observed in 
March 2013 (Figure 4.4).
This marked increase in ESA sanctions 
occurred soon after the new sanctions regime 
was introduced. Webster (2014a) notes that 
the increase in sanctions is unlikely to be 
related to the number of referrals of ESA 
claimants to the Work Programme, as these 
had fallen from 11,000 a month in December 
2012 to less than 5,000 a month in March 
2014. Some commentators25 have suggested 
that this increase in sanctions is partly driven 
by the higher number of claimants with 
mental health issues, who form an increasing 
proportion of ESA WRAG claimants being 
targeted by sanctions. 
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4.2 Key points 
•	 6.8 million sanctions have been applied 
to JSA claimants in the past 13 years and 
120,800 sanctions have been applied to 
ESA claimants since the introduction of 
ESA in 2008. 
•	 The sanction rate has increased 
dramatically over this period. For example, 
the number of JSA sanctions per 100 
claimants per month has almost tripled 
since 2001 (from 2.5 to seven sanctions 
per 100 claimants per month).
•	 There was a three-fold increase in the 
number of ESA sanctions per month 
between March 2013 and March 2014.
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The increase in sanctions for JSA and ESA 
claimants discussed in the previous chapter 
reflects the increasing requirements of 
conditionality. Unfortunately, no information 
is held on the system about claimants’ 
housing situation that permits assessment of 
the proportion of people sanctioned who are 
homeless. Nevertheless, in this chapter we 
draw what insights we can to offer tentative 
suggestions about the extent to which 
homeless people are being sanctioned. 
5.1 Insights from the 2011 census 
Young adults account for the largest 
proportion of JSA claimants sanctioned 
(Figure 5.1) with two thirds of all sanctions 
being applied to claimants under the age of 
35. In the year to March 2014, 39 per cent 
of sanctions before reconsiderations and 
appeals (408,200) were given to 18-24 year 
olds and a further 27 per cent to claimants 
aged 25-34. ESA sanctions are less skewed 
towards the younger age groups: just 11 per 
5. Sanctions applied to homeless claimants
Figure 5.1: Age profile of claimants and sanctions for ESA and JSA, Great Britain, 2013/2014





























aged 25-34 aged 35-49 aged 50-64
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cent were applied to 18-24 year olds (Figure 
5.1) and a further 24 per cent to claimants 
aged 25-34, partly reflecting the older age 
profile of ESA WRAG claimants generally. 
Nevertheless, both ESA and JSA claimants 
under the age of 25 are disproportionately 
affected by sanctions, as Figure 5.1 shows. 
Table 5.1 further underlines the differential 
impact of sanctions by age group. It shows, 
for example, that the sanction rate for 18-24 
year olds in 2013/14 was more than double 
the rate for 45-49 year olds and triple the rate 
for over 60s for both JSA and ESA claimants. 
So, how does the age profile of claimants 
who have been sanctioned compare 
with what is known about people living in 
homeless shelters or hostels? The 2011 
census enumerated 22,790 residents in such 
communal establishments in March 2011. 
The overwhelming majority were of working 
age and had a very young age profile with 
44 per cent being under the age of 25. As 
there is a higher rate of sanctions against 
claimants in this age group, claimants living in 
homeless shelters and hostels are likely to be 
disproportionately affected by sanctions (see 
Table 5.2). 
It is also possible to compare the gender 
profile of people living in homeless shelters or 
hostels with both JSA claimants as a whole 
and claimants who have been sanctioned 
(Table 5.3). In 2013/14 nearly three quarters 
(72%, 764,000) of all JSA sanctions were 
applied to men, and 669,000 of these 
sanctions were upheld after appeals and 
reconsiderations. The table also shows 
that male claimants are disproportionately 
affected by sanctions when set against the 
gender profile of JSA claimants as a whole. 
In the year ending March 2014 the average 
monthly sanction rate for men was 7.9 
sanctions per 100 JSA claimants, compared 
Table 5.1: Sanctions as a proportion of claimants by age group, GB, 2013/14
  JSA sanctions per 100 claimants per month
ESA Sanctions per 











Under 18 3.0 2.9 0
18 to 24 10.6 9.6 3.3
25 to 34 7.3 6.3 2.8
35 to 44 5.8 4.8 2.1
45 to 49 5.0 4.1 1.5
50 to 54 4.4 3.7 1.2
55 to 59 3.9 3.3 0.7
60 to 64 3.5 2.9 0.4
Total 7.0 6.1 1.6
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with 5.5 for women (Table 5.4). Given 
the slightly higher ratio of male to female 
residents living in homeless hostels or 
shelters compared to all JSA claimants, there 
is therefore likely to be a higher number of 
sanctions amongst the homeless population 
living in hostels or shelters - by virtue of age 
and gender - before other factors are taken 
into account.  
The gender profile is more evenly balanced 
for ESA WRAG claimants than for JSA 
claimants, and very similar to the WRAG as 
a whole - a rate of 1.6 sanctions per 100 
claimants for both male and female ESA 
WRAG claimants in March 2014.
Residents in homeless shelters or  
hostels 2011
JSA claimants 2013/2014
Number Percentage Sanctions only All
Age 16 to 24 9,550 44% 39% 26%
Age 25 to 34 4,430 20% 27% 26%
Age 35 to 49 5,560 25% 24% 30%
Age 50 to 64 2,270 10% 10% 18%
Total 16-24 21,810 100% 100% 100%
Table 5.2: Age profile of residents in homeless shelters or hostels, JSA claimants and those with JSA 
sanctions, Great Britain
Source: DWP Stat-Xplore, 2011 census













Male 72 65 69
Female 28 35 31
Total 100 100 100
 5. Sanctions applied to homeless claimants 17
26 To derive their figures Homeless Link did not survey homeless people. Rather, they asked homeless organisations to provide information on the 
number of their clients they believe to have been sanctioned. The reliability of the responses cannot, therefore, be verified and how each organi-
sation generated their estimate is not clear. This is not to say the figures are inaccurate, just that the methodology is not robust enough to ensure 
confidence in the results. It is also important to note that these figures are not comparable: the official statistics refer to a period of one month, 
while Homeless Link’s figures relate to a quarter.
27  Prior to the changes to the sanctions system in 2012, and with an international reach.
 
 
JSA sanctions per 100 claimants





Table 5.4: JSA sanctions as a proportion of claimants by gender, GB, 2013/14
Source: DWP Stat-Xplore
5.2 Insights from other evidence
The limited available research evidence lends 
support to the results of the analysis so far, 
suggesting that homeless claimants may 
be disproportionately sanctioned. Overall, 
more than six per cent of JSA claimants 
and 1.6 per cent of ESA claimants are 
sanctioned each month (see above) but a 
recent Homeless Link study suggests that 
sanction rates amongst homeless claimants 
may be much higher, affecting one third of 
homeless people claiming JSA and nearly 
one in five claiming ESA over a three month 
period (Homeless Link, 2013). Homeless Link 
also reported that the number of homeless 
people sanctioned had increased since 
the introduction of the new regime in 2012. 
These figures, whilst chiming with growing 
anecdotal evidence in the homelessness 
sector, must be treated with caution.26 As 
the only available evidence on the number 
of homeless people who face sanctions, 
however, it is frequently cited to justify claims 
that homeless people are disproportionately 
and unfairly sanctioned.  
Other studies refer to ‘vulnerable groups’ 
being at increased risk of sanctions but 
whether this includes homeless people is not 
always clear. Scottish Government analysis 
(Scottish Government, 2013), for example, 
concluded that sanctions tend to affect the 
most vulnerable in society (they specifically 
mention young people, lone parents and 
disabled people) while evidence presented 
to the Scottish Parliament Welfare Reform 
Committee by Barnado’s Scotland showed 
that 31 per cent of their service users had 
experienced sanctions (Scottish Parliament, 
2014). Similarly, the recent independent 
review of JSA sanctions (Oakley, 2014), while 
not mentioning homeless people specifically, 
reported that many Jobcentre Plus advisors 
‘identified a “vulnerable” group who tended to 
be sanctioned more than the others because 
they struggled to navigate the system’ (p.35). 
There is a body of evidence, like that 
presented by Oakley and the Scottish 
Government, that points to increased risk of 
sanctions amongst people with characteristics 
likely to present barriers to ‘navigating the 
system’. For example:
•	 A systematic evidence review by Griggs 
and Evans in 2010,27 pointed to a 
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correlation between higher sanction rates 
and ‘personal barriers’ such as substance 
misuse (Cherlin et al., 2001; Mancuso 
and Lindler, 2001; Eardley et al., 2005), 
domestic violence (Lee et al., 2004; Polit 
et al., 2001), ‘human capital deficits’ (lack 
of work experience and/or qualifications), 
and practical barriers to work, such as not 
having access to a car. 
•	 A report by the House of Commons Work 
and Pensions Committee (2014), found 
that a lack of access to computers, poor 
computing skills, ill health, and language 
and literacy problems result in the system 
failing for some clients. 
•	 Mitchell and Woodfield (2008) claim 
that sanctions are disproportionately 
experienced by more socially deprived or 
isolated or longer-term benefit recipients.
•	 Meyers et al. (2006) cite evidence from the 
USA showing claimants facing multiple 
barriers to work (lack of skills, low self-
esteem) being sanctioned more frequently.
Homelessness is rarely mentioned specifically 
in these studies but we know from the 
extensive literature on single homelessness 
that these ‘personal barriers’ are commonly 
experienced by homeless people (Wallace 
and Quilgers, 2005; Crisis, 2006; NEF, 2008; 
Fitzpatrick et al., 2013; Homeless Link, 2014; 
Johnsen and Watts, 2014).
Homeless people, then, may face a ‘double 
whammy’: disproportionally sanctioned 
by virtue of belonging to groups over-
represented in the sanctions statistics (young, 
male), but also more likely to experience 
barriers to complying with the new 
conditionality regime and, therefore, more 
likely to be sanctioned. These issues are 
explored further in Chapter 7 but first we look 
at how sanctions vary by place, and consider 
any relationship with levels of homelessness.
5.3 Key points
•	 Robust data on the numbers of homeless 
people sanctioned do not exist, 
representing a critical evidence gap.  
•	 Tentative insights that can be gleaned 
suggest that homeless people may be 
disproportionately affected by sanctions. 
They share some key characteristics with 
claimants most likely to be sanctioned 
(notably in terms of age and gender) but 
are also more likely to experience barriers 
to complying with the new conditionality 
regime (e.g. ill health, substance misuse, 
lack of work experience, and literacy 
issues).  
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28 2011 census data are based on merged districts. Westminster is merged with City of London and Isles of Scilly is merged with Cornwall. The 
merged rate is presented in each relevant district. As the vast majority of all homeless residents of hostels and shelters were of working age and 
this has been used as the base for the rate.
29 When the Great Britain unemployment rate was 2.9 per cent.
This Chapter examines how the outcomes 
of sanctions differ by place. First the census 
data for residents in homeless hostels 
and shelters is mapped, to highlight those 
geographical areas with concentrations of 
homeless people who may be vulnerable to 
the sanctions system.
There were 22,790 residents enumerated in 
homeless shelters or hostels on census night 
and 97 per cent were of working age (16-64). 
Figure 6.1 maps the number of residents in 
homeless hostels and shelters per 10,000 
working age population for all districts in 
Great Britain.28 As would be expected the 
districts with higher rates of homelessness 
tend to be the larger cities or urban areas 
where larger hostels are most commonly 
located. There are very low rates in large 
parts of more rural Britain, although this will 
reflect the lack of local hostel provision rather 
than the absence of homelessness. Many 
major cities and central London boroughs are 
among the fifty districts with the highest rates 
of people in homeless shelters or hostels (see 
Table 6.1). The list of districts with the highest 
rates of hostel residents per 10,000 working 
age population corresponds closely to the 
districts with the highest overall numbers of 
hostel/shelter residents. 
Figure 6.2 shows the distribution of JSA 
sanctions in March 2014 relative to the stock 
of JSA claimants in each district in February 
2014. The distribution of the areas with the 
highest sanction rates does not relate in a 
clear way to economic geography in terms 
of the relative strength of the labour market, 
the size of the district or its urban or rural 
characteristics. This is confirmed by looking 
the prevailing claimant unemployment 
rate29 in the 50 districts with the highest 
sanction rates (see Table 6.2): higher than 
average sanction rates are found in districts 
with both relatively low, and relatively high 
unemployment rates.  
Geographical variations in sanction rates 
are perhaps more explicable in terms of the 
geography of Jobcentre Plus districts, and 
the areas that are more advanced in trialling 
and implementing Universal Credit and 
the Claimant Commitment. For example, 
the map of Greater London in Figure 6.2. 
shows a clear east-west split in terms of the 
proportion of sanctions handed out, reflecting 
the division of Work Programme providers 
into East and West London.
Exploratory correlations, then, show no 
notable relationship between unemployment 
rate and sanctions rate but nor do they show 
a relationship between those areas with the 
highest number of hostel residents and the 
sanctions rate. This is not too surprising, 
given the relatively small size of the hostel or 
shelter population compared to the overall 
number of claimants being sanctioned and 
it would be worth interrogating the data 
further to explore the possibility of such a 
relationship emerging at a more residential 
spatial scale, such as Lower Super Output 
Areas. 
6. Geography of sanctions
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City of London* 39.4
Camden 28.6



























Hammersmith and Fulham 13.8
Isle of Wight 13.6
Bristol 13.5
Barking and Dagenham 13.5
Bedford 13.2
Oadby and Wigston 13.2
Glasgow 13.0






Newcastle upon Tyne 12.1
Lambeth 11.7








Source: Census of Population and Mid-Year Population Estimates; 
*Westminster and City of London census data based on a merged census district.
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Source: DWP Stat-Xplore, NOMIS
 6. Geography of sanctions 23
JSA sanctions 










High Peak 11.4 2.0
Tameside 11.2 3.4
West Dorset 11.2 0.9
East Staffordshire 11.2 1.9
Hambleton 10.9 1.2
Salford 10.7 3.7





Derby UA 10.1 3.4
Bromley 10.0 2.0
Aberdeenshire 10.0 0.8





Cheshire West and 
Chester 9.7 2.3
Clackmannanshire 9.7 4.4
Table 6.2: JSA claimant and sanctions rates, March 2014
* As a percentage of 16-64 resident population:
Source: DWP Stat-Xplore, NOMIS
JSA sanctions 


















Portsmouth UA 9.2 2.7
Norwich 9.2 3.5
East Renfrewshire 9.1 1.7
Charnwood 9.1 1.4
South Somerset 9.1 1.3
Newcastle upon Tyne 9.0 4.0
Lewisham 9.0 3.7
Stoke-on-Trent UA 9.0 4.0
Lancaster 9.0 2.5
North Tyneside 9.0 3.5
Suffolk Coastal 8.9 1.1
Reading UA 8.9 2.2
Preston 8.8 2.8
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6.1 Key points 
•	 The distribution of JSA sanctions across 
Great Britain does not relate in a clear 
way to economic geography in terms of 
the relative strength of the labour market, 
the size of the district or its urban or 
rural characteristics. Higher than average 
sanction rates are found in areas with 
both relatively low, and relatively high 
unemployment rates.  
•	 Geographical variations in sanctions may 
be more explicable in terms of geography 
of Jobcentre Plus districts, and the areas 
that are more advanced in trialling and 
implementing Universal Credit and the 
Claimant Commitment. 
•	 Initial analysis shows no obvious 
correlation between sanction rates and 
levels of homelessness (as measured 
by the number of residents in hostels 
and shelters per 10,000 working age 
population) but analysis as a lower 
geographical scale would need to be 
conducted to confirm this.
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30  See for example http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm140403/debtext/140403-0002.htm#14040352000001
31  The distribution of reasons for a sanction barely changes once reconsiderations and appeals are taken into account.
“Our evidence suggests that many 
claimants have been referred for a sanction 
inappropriately or in circumstances in 
which common sense would suggest that 
discretion should have been applied by 
JCP staff.” 
(Work and Pensions Select Committee, 
2014, p.3)
The “punitive and arbitrary nature of the 
new sanctions regime, which appears to 
be creating a climate of fear around job 
centres rather than encouraging claimants 
back to work.” 
(The Scottish Parliament 2014, p.12)
As the above extracts indicate, 
implementation of the sanctions system 
has been harshly criticised. Examples and 
case studies abound of people who have 
been sanctioned unfairly - found in evidence 
presented to official committees, to those 
reviewing the system (such as Oakley 
in 2014), by MPs in House of Commons 
debates,30 in the press and in research 
evidence. They include cases of claimants 
sanctioned for missing Jobcentre Plus (JCP) 
appointments because they were attending 
job interviews or were in hospital despite 
having informed JCP in advance. As the 
Scottish Parliament Welfare Committee 
report (2014) explained “The committee has 
received a wealth of examples of cases where 
sanctions have been misapplied or where 
insufficient flexibility has been shown” (p.13). 
Even without this qualitative evidence, the 
fact that around half of all ‘reconsidered’ 
decisions are overturned and many JCP 
7. Applying sanctions: ‘appropriate to capability’ or 
‘punitive and arbitrary’?
advisor referrals for sanction do not result in 
an adverse decision strongly indicates that, 
on the front line, unfair and inappropriate 
decisions are being made. The geographical 
variation in sanction rates (see Chapter 6), 
indicates further that sanction rates are 
influenced more by local implementation, 
than the behaviours and actions of claimants.
7.1 Reasons for sanctions: official 
statistics
The two most common reasons why the 
1,056,000 JSA claimants were sanctioned 
in 2013/14 were: failure to participate in 
the Work Programme; and not actively 
seeking employment (Table 7.1). These 
two factors accounted for two out of every 
three sanctions imposed. A further one in 
five claimants were sanctioned for failing to 
attend an advisor interview. Together these 
three reasons account for 84 per cent of all 
sanctions.31 
The higher rate of cases where sanctions 
are overturned due to non-compliance with 
the Work Programme (19 per cent) indicates 
that many JSA claimants have been wrongly 
penalised through this route; 81 per cent of 
cases are upheld after reconsideration or 
appeal, compared to 92 per cent of cases 
where people failed to attend an advisor 
interview, and 89 per cent for both failure 
to participate in skills conditionality or work 
experience. 
Taking account of reconsiderations and 
appeals and the higher level of sanctions 
being overturned due to non-participation in 
the Work Programme, not actively seeking 
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32  Time series until October 2013 used due to non-recording of mandatory reconsiderations from December 2013 onwards.
work becomes the most prevalent reason 
for a sanction (34 per cent) amongst JSA 
claimants. There has been a rapid rise in 
the proportion of all sanctions issued (after 
reconsiderations and appeals)32 for failing 
to actively seek work. Between March 2001 
and March 2006, not actively seeking work 
accounted for less than five per cent of 
all sanctions. It now accounts for around 
one in three of all sanctions imposed. 
Sanctions for this reason carry a greater 
penalty and are classified as intermediate 
level sanctions. Under this process, a 
claimant is disentitled to their claim and, if 
a new claim is made, a sanction of up to 
four weeks is imposed in the first instance. 
Each subsequent sanction given for this 
reason will lead to disentitlement with a 
sanction of up to 13 weeks. This leads to 
a more complex reconsideration appeals 
system, as the claimant has to appeal 
against the disentitlement and the sanction.  
Disentitlement also has consequences for 
any Housing Benefit claim which will be 
stopped until a fresh claim is made. 
There are three levels of sanction: low, 
intermediate and high (see Chapter 2 and 
Table 2.1 for further details). In 2013/14, 
over half of all JSA sanctions after 
reconsiderations and appeals were at the 
lower level (58 per cent) with a further third 
Table 7.1: Reasons for JSA sanction, Great Britain, 2013/14
Source: DWP Stat-Xplore
Reason Per cent of total sanctions 
before reconsiderations 
and appeals
Failure to participate in a scheme for assisting person to obtain employment 
without good reason - Work Programme
32
Not actively seeking employment 32
Failure to attend or failure to participate in an advisor interview without good 
reason
20
Left employment voluntarily without good reason 4
Refusal or failure to comply with a Jobseeker’s Direction without good reason 3
Failure to participate in a scheme for assisting person to obtain employment 
without good reason - Skills Conditionality
2
Refusal or failure to apply for, or accept if offered, a job which an employment 
officer has informed him/her is vacant or about to become vacant without good 
reason
2
Losing employment through misconduct 2
Not being available for work 1
Failure to participate in Mandatory Work Activity without good reason 1
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at the intermediate level. Less than one in 10 
sanctions were at the higher level, for reasons 
such as failure to participate in Mandatory 
Work Activity, or refusal to apply for, or 
accept, a job provided by an employment 
officer (see Figure 7.2). But this still equates 
to 90,000 higher level sanctions given for the 
year ending March 2014, and 71,000 of these 
remained after appeal.
Sanctions can only be applied to ESA 
claimants for two reasons: failing to attend a 
mandatory interview and failing to participate 
in work-related activity. In 2013/14, 87 per 
cent of ESA sanctions before reconsideration 
or appeal were due to the claimant not 
participating in a work-related activity. Figure 
7.2 shows how the pattern of reasons has 
changed over time. Until June 2011, when 
the Work Programme was introduced, all 
ESA sanctions were for failing to attend a 
mandatory interview. It was not until after 
the Work Programme was introduced that 
work-related activity became mandatory 
and gradually accounted for an increasing 
proportion of sanctions. By January 2012, 
this had become the most common reason 
for applying ESA sanctions, and the 
proportion of sanctions given for this reason 
continued to increase. By March 2014 it 
accounted for 95 per cent of all sanctions 
amongst the ESA WRAG.
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7.2 Reasons for sanctions: barriers 
to complying with conditionality 
As the extracts at the start of this chapter 
illustrate, significant concerns have been 
raised about the fairness of the sanctions 
system. Currently, homeless people are 
expected to meet the conditions of the 
benefits system the same as anyone else 
but the evidence raises questions about 
the extent to which homeless people are 
able to meet conditionality requirements 
given the barriers they face (including and in 
addition to their homelessness), and whether 
conditionality is being imposed according 
to capability as it should be. A key question 
here is whether the stricter regime has 
been implemented with sufficient attention 
to homeless claimants’ capabilities to fulfil 
conditions applied, or whether homeless 
people are disadvantaged from the outset 
by a system which does not recognise their 
vulnerability. 
Communication, information, and 
navigating the system
Oakley (2014) emphasises the importance 
of communication and understanding to the 
integrity and operation of the benefits system. 
He argues that if claimants do not understand 
the system, and so are being sanctioned for a 
lack of understanding rather than intentional 
behaviour, they are likely to feel unfairly 
treated, disillusioned and lose trust in the 
system. 
Yet evidence points to customer letters 
that are hard to understand ‘even for those 
working in the area’ (Oakley, 2014: 36), 
with unclear and vague wording, partly 





























































































Failure to participate in work related activity
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due to limited flexibility of IT systems in 
allowing the production of personalised 
letters (SSAC, 2013), a lack of personalised 
communications, with claimants’ 
communication preferences not being 
routinely recorded and poor communication 
between the Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP) and organisations that 
support DWP customers, such as Work 
Programme providers (SSAC, 2013; YMCA, 
2014). 
The Scottish Parliament go as far as saying 
‘it is clear from the evidence that we have 
received that poor communication by the 
Department for Work and Pensions is the 
biggest single weakness exhibited by the new 
sanctions regime’ (2014, p.15). Their report 
includes:
•	 Evidence from Citizens Advice Scotland 
that many of their clients do not know they 
have been sanctioned until they ‘go to the 
bank and find they have no cash’ (Scottish 
Parliament 2014, p.15), a fact supported 
by evidence from the YMCA (2014). 
•	 Evidence from Barnado’s Scotland 
pointing to the complexity of letters sent 
out, which are ‘full of jargon’ and difficult 
to understand. 
•	 Evidence that DWP fail to take into 
account that many people on benefits 
have neither the access nor the necessary 
IT skills to utilise DWP’s Universal 
Jobmatch facility or to carry out job 
searches online. This is supported by 
a Citizens Advice Scotland survey of 
Scottish Citizens Advice Bureaux benefit 
claimants which found that only 54 per 
cent had an internet connection at home 
and less than a quarter of respondents felt 
able to apply for jobs or benefits without 
help.
These problems are not new. Prior to 
the introduction of the new regime, 
communication issues were evident. 
Accessibility and availability of information 
(NAO, 2005), and the low levels of awareness 
around sanctions (Dorsett, 2008) are 
particular problems highlighted, as well as 
reliance on telephone and the internet and 
letters for communication (SSAC, 2006). 
Mitchell and Woodfield (2008) found some 
claimants were unaware of having to attend 
an interview until they were sanctioned for 
non-attendance, having not received an 
initial contact letter, as well as considerable 
confusion among claimants around the 
wording of letters.
Such issues are likely to be compounded 
for people who are homeless. Homeless 
people, for example, are less likely to receive 
letters because they are more transitory, live 
in large hostels where letters frequently get 
lost, or are of no fixed abode (Homeless Link, 
2013; Webster, 2014a). Further, homeless 
people are more likely to have complex 
needs, chaotic lifestyles, learning and literacy 
difficulties, and substance misuse issues, 
so understanding poorly articulated letters, 
and complying with extensive requirements 
set out in their Claimant Commitment could 
prove significant hurdles (Homeless Link, 
2013). St Mungo’s and Broadway, in evidence 
presented to the Oakley review, reported 
that 10 per cent of their clients are unable 
to read a letter without support and 33 per 
cent are unable to complete a form without 
support, and a recent study found that 60 
per cent of homeless people have low or no 
qualifications (Homeless Link, St. Mungo’s 
and Crisis, 2012). Faced with these support 
needs, the appeals process in particular is 
difficult to navigate (YMCA, 2014) although 
Peter’s and Joyce note that even amongst the 
general JSA population few claimants appeal, 
given the lengthy applications and processes 
involved, the lack of support given, and the 
cost of phone calls/stamps/transportation 
needed to do so (Peter’s and Joyce, 2006). 
The reliance on telephones and IT for job 
searching, appeals, and general information 
about the benefits system and sanctions 
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process also leaves homeless people at a 
considerable disadvantage from the outset, 
with computer illiteracy prevalent (Cork 
Simon Community, 2012) and access to 
computers sometimes limited. The reliance 
by DWP on IT for key aspects of mandatory 
job search requirements coupled with 
the barriers faced by homeless people in 
accessing it raises the question of deepening 
social exclusion for an already marginalised 
group (Muggleton and Ruthven, 2012). 
Ill health
According to Homeless Link (2013), homeless 
people are most commonly sanctioned for 
failing to attend a Jobcentre Plus advisory 
interview or failing to follow formal instruction 
to actively seek work. Failing to attend an 
interview results in a four-week sanction. 
Ill health and hospital appointments 
were principal reasons given for missed 
appointments (resulting in a sanction) with 
Jobcentre Plus. 
Griggs and Evans (2010) also point to a 
range of US and UK studies (Cherlin et al., 
2001; Meyers et al., 2006) which cite health 
problems and disability as the main barriers 
to participation in conditionality, leading 
to sanctioning. Health audit results in a 
study by Homeless Link (2014: 3) highlight 
the extent to which homeless people are 
experiencing ‘some of the worst health 
problems in society’, finding that homeless 
people face physical, mental and substance 
misuse issues at levels much higher than 
the general population. Health issues are 
caused and/or exacerbated by ‘unhealthy 
lifestyles’ (smoking, poor diet, and alcohol), 
‘not enough help’, and inadequate housing. 
The proportion of homeless people with 
diagnosed mental health problems (45 per 
cent) is almost double that of the general 
population (25 per cent) and a third of the 
homeless respondents in the study reported 
high use of drugs and alcohol. Bauld et 
al. (2010) reviewed literature on alcohol 
misuse, employment and benefit uptake 
to find that clients with substance misuse 
issues encountered a number of challenges 
in ‘negotiating’ the benefit system. Some 
studies note the failure of Jobcentre Plus 
advisors to pick up on these health barriers 
that are likely to affect participation from the 
beginning (Homeless Link, St. Mungo’s and 
Crisis, 2012). 
Documentation requirements
No provision is made in current sanctioning 
processes to account for the difficulties 
homeless people face surrounding safe 
storage and organisation of documentation, 
especially if the individual is sleeping rough 
(Burt et al., 2012). A study by Crisis (2004) 
showed that homeless people are 47 times 
more likely to be victims of theft compared to 
the general public. Considering these factors, 
homeless people will likely experience 
considerable challenges in not just 
receiving but retaining Jobcentre Plus/DWP 
correspondence detailing key dates, times 
and venues for interviews and appointments.
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7.3 Key points 
•	 The most common reason for a sanction 
at present is failing to actively seek work 
(around one third of all JSA sanctions). 
•	 Implementation of the sanctions system 
has been harshly criticised. Evidence 
suggests that communication is often 
poor, letters are difficult to understand, 
claimants are not informed of their 
sanction, and the system is criticise for 
failing to take account of claimants limited 
access to the internet and IT skills.  
•	 Examples and case studies abound of 
people who have been sanctioned unfairly. 
Around half of all ‘reconsidered’ decisions 
are overturned and many JCP advisor 
referrals for sanction do not result in an 
adverse decision, suggesting that, on 
the front line, unfair and inappropriate 
decisions are being made.
•	 Currently, homeless people are expected 
to meet the conditions of the benefits 
system the same as anyone else but 
the evidence raises questions about the 
extent to which homeless people are able 
to meet conditionality requirements given 
the barriers many face. This includes ill 
physical and mental health, learning and 
literacy difficulties, no fixed address to 
receive letters, and difficulties accessing 
safe storage for documentation.
32 Benefit sanctions and homelessness: a scoping report
Commentators point to a range of potential 
negative outcomes resulting from sanctions. 
The Scottish Government, for example, 
suggested that: 
“Negative outcomes over the long-term 
can include: debt and hardship; poor 
physical and mental health; negative 
impacts on the development and well-
being of children affected by sanctions; 
a potential increase in crime; and 
sanctioned claimants increased likelihood 
to enter into informal work which is not 
seen as progression towards recognised 
employment.” 
(Scottish Government, 2013: 1)
Benefits are a vital lifeline to help people 
make the transition out of homelessness. 
(Homeless Link, 2013) and there is much 
evidence to suggest that homeless people 
already disproportionately experience 
financial hardship and poor health, and 
that use of food banks is commonplace 
(see below). The withdrawal of benefit will 
have a detrimental impact on any claimant 
but for those already suffering hardship the 
consequences may be particularly severe. 
This section pinpoints a series of added 
hardships and set-backs experienced by 
claimants generally, and homeless people 
specifically, as a consequence of being 
sanctioned.
Food poverty: Food hardship amongst 
sanctioned claimants is found to be 
particularly pronounced (Vincent, 1998; Lee 
et al., 2004; Oxfam and Church Action on 
Poverty, 2013; YMCA, 2014). Figures from 
the Trussell Trust show that ‘up to half of all 
people turning to food banks are doing so 
as a direct result of having benefit payments 
delayed, reduced or withdrawn altogether’ 
(Oxfam and Church Action on Poverty, 
2013: 3) and research on the experience of 
sanctions amongst vulnerable young people 
found that 84 per cent had cut back on 
food as a result of being sanctioned (YMCA 
2014). Homeless Link (2014) found similarly 
that many homeless people experience 
food poverty and rely on food banks while 
sanctioned as a quick-fix solution, although 
point out that some food banks limit support 
to emergency provision for three days only. 
Withdrawal of benefit due to sanction far 
exceeds this short timeframe. In addition, 
homeless people already experience 
food poverty without the withdrawal of 
benefits. Fitzpatrick et al. (2012) document 
these problems: 38 per cent of homeless 
respondents in their study had shoplifted to 
obtain food; 32 per cent had begged; and 10 
per cent had obtained food by engaging in 
sex acts. 
The situation can only deteriorate further if 
sanctioned. Anecdotal evidence references 
weight loss, ‘bin-diving’, under-eating and 
malnourishment (Webster, 2013; Head, 2014).
Survival crime: There is evidence that some 
sanctioned claimants turn to crime to get by. 
One study, plotting the relationship between 
benefit sanctions and crime rates prior to 
the new regime, found that areas with high 
sanctions rates correlated with areas of rising 
crime (Machin and Marie, 2006). In relation to 
homeless people 28 out of 45 organisations 
responding to the Homeless Link study (2013) 
reported that some clients had shoplifted 
or committed survival theft as a result of 
sanctions. Anecdotal evidence supports this 
further: ‘with nobody to turn to, and feeling 
like it was my only option, I pocketed a 
sandwich from a supermarket. I was arrested 
and fined £80’ (Head, 2014).
Family/relationship tensions: Whilst some 
homeless people lack support from family 
8. The impact of sanctions on claimants
 8. The impact of sanctions on claimants 33
and friends (Action for Children, 2014; 
Webster, 2013), those able to seek short-
term financial support from family after being 
sanctioned are often placed in stressful 
situations. Homeless Link (2013) found that 
43 out of the 44 services claimed that the 
homeless people accessing their services 
borrowed from friends or family in the first 
instance. Difficulty repaying family members 
leads to family problems, tension and 
arguments (Dorsett et al., 2011) and can have 
a knock-on effect of debt and stress for the 
sanctioned claimant’s family: ‘My mum has 
been taken to court and fined for not being 
able to pay the shortfall in Council Tax and 
is struggling to pay the rent arrears accrued 
when I was sanctioned and the strain has 
quite literally smashed our family to pieces 
– I feel like a burden on her and have felt 
suicidal on more than one occasion’ (Greater 
Manchester CAB, 2013, p18). 
Anxiety/health issues: Many studies point 
to detrimental effects of benefit sanctions 
on a person’s health and well-being, 
including stress and anxiety stemming 
from financial hardship and spiralling debt, 
strained familial relations, and the fear of 
eviction and homelessness (Peters and 
Joyce, 2006; Mitchell and Woodfield, 2008; 
Goodwin, 2008; SSAC, 2012; YMCA, 2014), 
as well as feelings of anger, humiliation, 
depression, anxiety and loss of motivation 
(Molloy and Ritchie, 2000; Joyce et al., 2006; 
Dorsett, 2008). A CAB study (2013) found 
that a number of sanctioned claimants had 
attempted suicide or felt suicidal. Impacts 
of sanctioning on health are found to be 
heightened for those with existing health 
problems, and we already know that long-
term physical health problems, diagnosed 
mental health problems, and substance use 
issues are more prevalent amongst homeless 
people than the general population. One 
study, for example, found that customers 
with existing mental health conditions felt 
that sanctions had a ‘significant’ impact on 
their health: ‘customers in this group tended 
to see the worry and anxiety produced by 
the sanction as making their condition more 
pronounced’ (Mitchell and Woodfield, 2008: 
80). Homeless Link (2013) found this to be 
the case amongst sanctioned homeless 
claimants with existing mental health and 
substance use issues too. Thirty eight out 
of the 45 organisations reported that clients 
experienced increased anxiety or depression 
when sanctioned.
Disengagement/loss of trust in the 
system: Far from achieving the desired 
intention of driving the ‘right behaviour’, 
evidence suggests that benefit sanctions do 
not motivate homeless people, or claimants 
more generally, back into work or to engage 
with Jobcentre Plus (Homeless Link, 2013). 
Rather, sanctions can make it more difficult to 
find work, to travel to interviews, and to buy 
suitable interview clothes, thus consolidating 
claimants’ situations, rather than freeing them 
from disadvantage. 
Further, a small body of evidence suggests 
that sanctions can disincentivise vulnerable 
claimants from engaging with the benefits 
system or finding work, and drive a greater 
rift between claimants and Jobcentre 
Plus (Griggs and Bennett, 2009; SSAC, 
2012; Homeless Link, 2013; YMCA, 2014). 
Research by YMCA highlighted examples of 
young vulnerable people (some homeless) 
unable to seek work while sanctioned - “it 
stopped me searching for work as I had no 
money to get to different employers” (YMCA 
2014: 7) - although they also found examples 
of sanctions incentivising claimants to 
comply and seek work, so the picture here 
is mixed. SSAC (2012) similarly found some 
claimants were de-motivated and alienated 
by the threat of sanctions. This report cites a 
study by Lane et al. (2011) showing how lone 
parents withdrew from active engagement 
with Jobcentre Plus after a sanction had 
been imposed. Loss of trust in advisors 
could have significant detrimental effects on 
the operation of the benefits system given 
that the relationships between advisors 
and claimants are seen as critical to the 
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effectiveness of ‘both conditionality and 
sanctions’ (SSAC, 2012: 16).  
Fuel poverty: A number of studies found 
claimants unable to heat their homes as a 
result of sanctions. Unable to top up gas and 
electricity meters and, for those without pre-
payment meters, struggling to pay utility bills, 
claimants are left without heat and risk debt 
and disconnection of services (Homeless 
Link, 2013; CAB, 2014)
This chapter has reviewed evidence about the 
impact of sanctions on those whose benefit 
is withdrawn. But there is also a question 
about whether benefit sanctions have 
consequences for levels of homelessness. 
In other words, to what extent do benefit 
sanctions increase a claimant’s risk of 
homelessness? We consider this question 
briefly in the next chapter.
8.1 Key points
•	 Benefits are a vital lifeline to help people 
make the transition out of homelessness. 
The withdrawal of benefits will have a 
detrimental impact on any claimant but 
for those already suffering hardship the 
consequences may be particularly severe. 
•	 There is evidence of a range of negative 
outcomes associated with sanctions, 
including:
 - Food poverty
 - Survival crime
 - Mental and physical health problems
 - Debt
 - Fuel poverty
 - Disengagement with the system
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33 Claimants subject to intermediate level sanctions face disentitlement to JSA and so their JSA claim ceases altogether until they re-claim. At this 
point they then face a sanction of up to 4 weeks (or up to 13 weeks for subsequent failures to comply). Once a JSA claim ceases, all passported 
benefits claims, including HB, will also be stopped and a fresh claim will have to be made.  
A small body of evidence is emerging to 
suggest that, as well as exacerbating the 
problems homeless people face, sanctions 
may increase the risk of homelessness 
(Webster, 2013). Principally this is because 
claimants cut back on housing costs (rent, 
board, service charges) or fail to re-claim 
Housing Benefit when a sanction is imposed, 
accruing arrears and risking eviction. 
9.1 Sanctions: increasing the risk of 
homelessness? 
Evidence on the impact of sanctions on 
claimants’ ability to meet their housing costs 
is limited, but does suggest that people 
struggle to maintain rent payments whilst 
sanctioned, in both settled and temporary 
accommodation. For example:
•	 Griggs and Evans (2010) point to 
Australian research suggesting that 
between 10 and 20 per cent of sanctioned 
claimants lose their accommodation or 
have to relocate into cheaper housing 
(Eardley et al., 2005). 
•	 A YMCA survey found that 81 per cent of 
respondents (vulnerable young people) cut 
back on housing costs as a result of being 
sanctioned (YMCA, 2014).
•	 Homeless Link research (2013) found 
that 23 out of 44 organisations reported 
that their clients had been evicted as a 
result of being sanctioned, and 44 out of 
45 organisations reported that homeless 
people (in temporary accommodation) 
were falling into arrears. Respondents also 
9. The impact of sanctions on homelessness: Mapping 
the relationship between homelessness, benefit 
sanctions and wider reforms
reported that sanctions were affecting their 
receipt of Housing Benefit from homeless 
clients, and reported an increase in their 
issue of evictions or notices to quit (22 out 
of the 39 organisations reported this).
Cases cited in the press and in research 
evidence include: ‘I lost my flat as I was 
£1,000 in rent arrears and I had piles of 
outstanding bills’ (Head, 2014); ‘because my 
Housing Benefit wasn’t paid for 3 months 
and still hasn’t been reinstated, I’m facing 
eviction and I’m a full-time carer to my adult 
son’ (CAB, 2013: 17); ‘I have been kicked 
out of my mother’s household due to being 
sanctioned and I’m now homeless’ (CAB, 
2013: 19).
When a claimant is sanctioned only their 
JSA or ESA is withdrawn. Entitlement 
to Housing Benefit (HB) is not affected. 
However, when a sanction is applied this 
constitutes a change in circumstances and 
HB is automatically suspended until the 
claimant informs the HB department of their 
revised financial circumstances (referred to as 
a ‘nil income claim’).33 Concerns have been 
voiced, and evidence presented that when 
claimants’ JSA or ESA is withdrawn, they 
frequently lose their HB as well, having not 
been adequately informed of the procedure 
(Oakley, 2014; Webster, 2014a; Webster 
2014b). Assuming that only their JSA/ESA 
is affected by the sanction, claimants can 
remain unaware that their HB has stopped 
until they are already in rent arrears.
Even those who are adequately informed, can 
navigate the system effectively and whose 
HB continues to be paid are also at risk. HB 
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34 These are just some of the changes being made. Other changes include increasing the level of non-dependent deductions for those claiming 
HB, time limiting ESA, imposing a one per cent cap on the uprating of nearly all working age benefits, and a myriad of changes to the Tax Credit 
system.
35 The space standards applied expect children under the age of 15 to share with another child of the same gender, and children under nine to 
share with another child regardless of gender. A couple living in a three bedroom property with their two male children aged 15 and 12 would, 
therefore, be classed as having a spare room.
does not always cover tenants’ full housing 
costs, even if they are on a passported 
benefit (i.e. eligible for ‘full’ HB). Recent 
changes, including the lowering of the rent 
rate payable to private rented sector tenants 
and the Removal of the Spare Room Subsidy 
(known as the ‘bedroom tax’) have left many 
tenants with a shortfall to make up from their 
other income. We consider these changes 
further below. Also, rent sometimes includes 
costs not covered by Housing Benefit - 
service charges, for example - that tenants 
pay from other income. Rent arrears can, 
therefore, accrue to tenants still in receipt of 
HB if they unable to meet this portion of their 
rent. The majority of organisations (30 out of 
39) surveyed by Homeless Link reported that 
clients had accrued service charge arrears as 
a result of sanctions. 
9.2 Sanctions, homelessness and 
other reforms 
Benefit sanctions or, more specifically, 
the financial impact of benefits sanctions 
must be seen within the context of a 
raft of changes and reforms over the 
past five years: changes which have 
increased housing insecurity and reduced 
incomes, particularly for the poorest people 
and communities. In addition to harsher 
sanctions, other key reforms to the benefit 
system that have reduced some households’ 
income, including HB, are as follows34.
•	 The Removal of the Spare Room 
Subsidy, or ‘bedroom tax’ was introduced 
for social renting tenants in April 2013 
and makes a percentage reduction 
from a claimants HB of 14 per cent for 
households with one ‘spare’35 bedroom 
and 25 per cent for those with two ‘spare’ 
bedrooms. People unable or unwilling to 
move face a shortfall in their HB.
•	 A cap on the total benefit a household 
can receive of £350 per week for 
single people and £500 per week for 
couples with children and lone parents 
was introduced in April 2013 so that 
households in receipt of benefit do not 
receive more than median net earnings.  
•	 The ‘Shared Accommodation Rate’ 
(SAR) for Local Housing Allowance was 
extended to single adults under the 
age of 35 from January 2012. Until then, 
single people aged 16-25 renting from a 
private landlord were only entitled to HB 
at the rate for shared (not self-contained) 
accommodation. This rule now applies to 
single adults aged 16-35. People living 
in self-contained accommodation with 
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36 Beatty and Fothergill’s analysis incorporates many more changes that are mentioned here, including the freeze on some benefits, removal of 
Child benefit from high earners and various changes to sickness and disability benefits and tax credits. The ‘£470’ figure takes all these changes 
into account.  It does not, however, take account of benefit sanctions.
37  This report is specific to social renting tenants. 
rents higher than the SAR have to move to 
shared accommodation or face a shortfall 
in their LHA. 
•	 In April 2011 LHA rates were reduced 
from the median local private sector 
market rent to the 30th percentile of local 
market rents; and rates were capped by 
property size. Anyone whose rent is higher 
than the 30th percentile will face a shortfall 
in their LHA. 
•	 Council Tax Benefit (CTB) was replaced 
by ‘Council Tax Reduction Schemes’ in 
April 2013. Each local authority was given 
responsibility for running their own scheme 
and the Government reduced the amount 
of money given to each LA by 10 per cent. 
Many LAs have passed this reduction on 
to claimants so that people who previously 
would have had their council tax costs 
covered by CTB now have to make up the 
shortfall from other income. 
Analysis by Beatty and Fothergill shows 
that welfare reform changes, combined, 
remove £470 per year, on average, from every 
working age adult in Great Britain (Beatty and 
Fothergill, 2013).36 Geographical variation 
means that the impact is as high as £700- 
£900 in some locations - typically the most 
deprived parts of Great Britain. When all the 
reforms are fully implemented (in the main 
by 2014/15) the financial loss to working age 
adults will be nearly £19bn a year.  
Some households will be able to 
accommodate this reduction in their income, 
and some may find employment or additional 
working hours as the economy begins to 
recover. Others, certainly, will not, with many 
households already struggling to get by. A 
survey of ‘credit, debt and financial difficulty’ 
in 2012, for example, defined 11 per cent of 
respondents as being in financial difficulty. 
In total, 22 per cent reported constantly 
struggling to keep up, or falling behind with 
bills and payments and 19 per cent said that 
‘more often than not’ they struggled to last 
until their next payday (BIS, 2013). A survey 
of social rented tenants in 2012 found high 
levels of indebtedness, including existing rent 
arrears, and more than half reported regularly 
running out of money before the end of the 
week (DWP, 2013). 
In this context, it is easy see how benefit 
sanctions could, potentially, increase 
claimants’ risk of homelessness, particularly 
as reduced income - and financial 
circumstances more broadly - has been 
found to be a key driver of rent arrears 
(DWP, 2014b).37 The introduction of Direct 
Payment of HB in the social rented 
sector, as part of Universal Credit (UC), may 
exacerbate the situation. Tenants who receive 
their HB directly (most private rented tenants, 
a small number of HA tenants and, once UC 
is rolled out, most social rented tenants) and 
who are sanctioned face a choice between 
paying their housing costs and paying for 
food, heating, travel costs and such like. 
It is easy to see how HB could be diverted 
to these essentials in such circumstances. 
There is evidence that tenants in the social 
rented sector who receive their HB directly 
are already using their HB to cover essentials, 
without the added financial impact of being 
sanctioned (DWP, 2014a).
Add to this the erosion of housing security, 
particularly for vulnerable people, and the 
picture becomes bleaker, with the likelihood 
of eviction as a result of rent arrears higher 
in less secure housing tenures. There is 
increased reliance on the private rented 
sector - a sector that remains unregulated 
- for meeting housing need. Changes 
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brought in through the Localism Act 2011 
in England, for example, included the 
right of local authorities to discharge their 
homelessness duty into the private rented 
sector. It also devolved power to local 
authorities to determine who qualifies for 
social housing, which has restricted access 
to this more secure rented sector. Following 
the introduction of the Localism Act some 
local authorities have closed, or removed 
people without ‘reasonable preference’, 
from their waiting lists, and are prioritising 
allocations to those in work. Security in the 
social rented sector is also being eroded, 
with the introduction of conditional and fixed 
term tenancies. There is some evidence that 
welfare reforms are prompting some Housing 
Associations to take a more commercial, 
and risk-averse approach to lettings, 
prioritising those in employment and who can 
demonstrate financial security, and thereby 
restricting access for the most vulnerable. 
These housing-related reforms (including 
those to HB) are seen as increasingly 
undermining housing as the ‘saving grace’ of 
an otherwise relatively ungenerous welfare 
system (Tunstall et al., 2013). 
We see, then, how benefit sanctions intersect 
with other recent welfare and housing policy 
changes to impact, potentially, on levels of 
homelessness. It is also worth noting that 
increased severity of benefit sanctions has 
coincided with an escalation in the use of 
conditional and enforcement approaches to 
homelessness, especially in its more ‘visible’ 
forms (Johnsen et al., 2014). This includes 
Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs), 
arrests under the Vagrancy Act 1824, and 
controlled drinking zones (Johnsen et al., 
2014) as well as efforts to responsibilise 
homeless people - asking rough sleepers 
pay for hot food at a day-centre, for instance 
(Whiteford, 2010). This increasing ‘tough love’ 
ethic towards homelessness (Fitzpatrick and 
Jones, 2005), is mirrored in the new benefits 
and sanctions regime.
9.3 Key points
•	 As well as exacerbating the problems 
homeless people face, sanctions may also 
increase the risk of homelessness. This 
is principally because claimants cut back 
on, or cannot support their housing costs 
(rent, board, service charges) or fail to 
reclaim HB when a sanction is imposed. 
•	 This must be placed within the context 
of the raft of other reforms recently 
implemented that are increasing 
housing insecurity and reducing income, 
particularly for the poorest people and 
communities. This includes: the removal 
of the spare room subsidy (the ‘bedroom 
tax’); changes in the LHA rates; extension 
of the LHA shared room rate; changes to 
Council Tax Benefit; and the Localism Act 
2011. 
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Available evidence, scant as is it, 
suggests that homeless people may be 
disproportionately affected by sanctions. 
Given their already marginalised position in 
society and the multiple barriers they face, 
homeless people struggle to negotiate and 
satisfy the conditions set out in their Claimant 
Commitments, under a regime both ‘complex 
and difficult to understand’ (Griggs and 
Bennett, 2009: 36). Some have commented 
that the unfair and disproportionate 
sanctioning of those who are unable to 
effectively negotiate the benefits system 
ultimately conflicts with other important 
government goals, such as the reduction of 
poverty (Griggs and Bennett, 2009). 
Research so far has, however, only skimmed 
the surface and official statistics tell us 
very little about benefit sanctions and 
homelessness. The evidence presented in 
this scoping paper raises serious questions 
about the appropriateness, effectiveness, 
and consequences of benefit sanctions for 
homeless people, and the potential impact 
of sanctions on levels of homelessness, but 
no firm conclusions can currently be drawn. 
Through further research over the coming 
year we hope to start building a robust 
evidence base, so that informed debate 
can take place about the appropriateness 
and effectiveness of welfare conditionality 
and benefit sanctions in the context of 
homelessness.  
10. Conclusions
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